This collection examines different themes and offers novel interpretations of Hegel's political philosophy. Thus, it sheds new light on what has been perhaps the most controversial area of Hegelian scholarship. It includes eight essays by a group of international scholars at different stages of their career. Its distinctive contribution is that it explores both Hegel's early and mature political philosophy. It includes a paper on Hegel's early essay on "Natural Law", published in two instalments in 1802 and 1803, (...) and the System of Ethical Life, also published in 1802-1803, as well as papers on Hegel's Philosophy of Right (published in 1821). Two papers also discuss "The German Constitution", written between 1798 and 1802. The volume comes as an addition to the current debate that has been occasioned by the bicentenary of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. (shrink)

_Hegel and Schelling in Early Nineteenth-Century France_ is a two-volume work that documents the French reception of G. W. F. Hegel and F. W. J. Schelling from 1801 to 1848. It shows that the story of the "French Hegel" didn't begin with Wahl and Kojève by giving readers a solid understanding of the various ways in which German Idealism impacted nineteenth-century French philosophy, as well as providing the first ever English-language translations of excerpts from the most important philosophical texts (...) of the era. Inside volume one, readers will find a number of interpretative frameworks to help them get to grips with this neglected field in the history of ideas. In addition to excerpted translations and a narrative of Hegel’s and Schelling’s fate in France during the early nineteenth century, this volume includes an introduction on transnational reception history, as well as an analytical catalogue of the translations of their work produced in French at this time, of the publications which appropriated or interrogated their philosophical legacy, and of the journals, institutional structures and other mechanisms of dissemination that brought Hegel’s and Schelling’s philosophy into France. The book thus details the ways in which French philosophers of the period took up the debates and concepts of German Idealism, transformed them or rejected them. In this way, it aims to contribute to a reversal of the serious neglect of early nineteenth-century French thought in English-language scholarship and, in so doing, goes beyond a nation-based narrative of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

It is the avowed aim of Avineri’s study to "bring out the ambivalent indebtedness of Marx to the Hegelian tradition." This aim determines the central place of Marx’s concept of man in his discussion; for it was from Hegel and the young Hegelians that Marx drew the anthropological problematic which dominates his early writings. The Hegelian concept of Geist served the young Hegelians as the model for a philosophical conception of man, as a being exhibiting the unique dignity of (...) his rational nature in a historical process through which he attains to freedom and self-knowledge. Carrying this aim out with the greatest clarity and completeness was Feuerbach, who, applying to Hegelian philosophy what Avineri calls his "transformative method," attempted to interpret Hegel’s "Spirit" and the speculative concepts through which it knows itself as false inversions of the self-consciousness of man as a natural, sensuous being. It was this method, applied to Hegel’s political philosophy, which resulted in what Avineri describes as "Marx’s first systematic work," the 1843 critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. A full chapter of Avineri’s book is devoted to this "most systematic of [Marx’s] writings on political theory." Avineri views the work as an immanent critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, focusing on Hegel’s failure adequately to comprehend the rationality of the actual. The cause of this failure was Hegel’s hypostatization of abstractions as the subjects of the social process; Marx’s application of the "transformative method" was an attempt to understand the specific character of the real human subjects who are the actual foundation of these speculative constructions. Avineri traces in detail the manner in which Marx confronts the speculative functions assigned by Hegel to monarchy, civil estates, and the state bureaucracy with the social realities represented by these speculative categories. Marx argues that the supposed universality of the state is an illusion, mystifying the social practice of modern society and confirmed by Hegel’s philosophical speculation. In fact, he argues, the "universal" interests of the state are only expressions of private interests in what Hegel called the sphere of "civil society," the realm of production and exchange. It is the relationships of men in this sphere which in Marx’s view constitute the true foundation for the rationality of the actual, and it was Hegel’s speculative inversion of the relationship of civil society and the state which was responsible for his failure to grasp this rationality. Marx’s stress on the sphere of civil society as the foundation for political life, the priority of man’s productive life over all other social relationships, is the characteristic Marxian form of the young Hegelian conversion of a speculative science of spirit into a philosophy of man. It was this priority, which Marx later referred to as the "universal result" of his early research, which continued to guide his later studies. Avineri proceeds to take up this theme in a chapter appropriately titled "Homo Faber.". (shrink)

Early period (h. I-III) works are the most basic data sources in tafsīr studies. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. In this process, the literacy and schooling rate is low. It is not easy to obtain sufficient writing materials. For this reason, the information was initially transferred as a verbal, some of the original material that has been written has not survived. The information, which is usually narrated and sometimes written, can be learned (...) through the written copies of the next dates. However, there are serious time intervals between the author and the manuscript copies. This time period has led to some problems. There are such works that the author is controversial. There is such information that it is obvious that it was added later. Although some works belonging to the period were compiled from the sources of the following centuries, they were printed under the name of some people who lived in the early period, as if they gave the impression of author copy. Each of these matters has the quality to affect the nature of the information to be used as reference and the perception to be created on it. The relation of the subject with the interpretation of the Qur'ān and the fact that it is binding has a special importance, therefore, it requires knowing the formation stages of the reference source, especially in the commentary of tafsīr. In the article, the author-work relation in early tafsīr works has been tried to be processed on a sufficient number of examples with their respective dimensions.Summary: Early works in tafsīr studies are the most basic data sources. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. The data at the beginning were verbally transmitted, but some original material that has been written has not survived until nowadays. Therefore, the information about tafsīr are derived from the mainly Buhkārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) which have tafsīr contents, and encyclopedic sources which have been contended narrations suhc as Țabarī (d. 310/923) and Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/938).Some later dated work/s belonged to people who lived in the early period alo contribute to this accumulation. However, in scientific studies it is necessary to pay attention to the harmony or difference between the author manuscripts and copies which have been survived. Because the limited possibilities of the period, the time interval between the author and the writing copy, the corrosion that occurred in the texts over time, the capacity or thought the scribe has caused the addition and reduction of the original copy of the text. Although it is rare, it is also possible to attribute the work to a well-known person of the period in order to gain the reputation of the views in the work.In this regard, the article first draws attention to the time difference between the author and the copies that have survived to the present day. Accordingly, it was emphasized that there may be works with controversial belonging to the author. Because, it may be that the names of those who expand, explain or shorten the work with additions are given as the author's name.It is shown with examples that additions to the work could be made in the time interval between the author and the manuscript that has survived to the present day. However, sometimes the difference between copies can be based on many reasons, from the ignorance of the obscene to its forgetfulness and even deliberate replacement. Even in the hadith narrations that attribute special importance to its narration, it is quite possible that the additions were made intentionally or unknowingly, even after the transition to the written period.However, this study was carried out only on tafsīr works. Because even the sampling on a limited number of tafsīr works pushes the limits of the article.In the study, the original texts of the selected works as samples such as Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Farrāʾ, Abū ʿUbayda, etc. were reviewed, and the master's and doctorate studies on the relevant works and the period, especially their editorial evaluations, were tried to be examined as much as possible. In the evaluations, the classical period sources such as Ibnu-Nadīm, Thaʻlabī and Ibn Khallikān, where tafsīr works were subject, as well as the Ottoman period like Edirnevī; Modern era works such as Brockelman and Sezgin were used. Books, articles and encyclopedia articles evaluating the manuscripts were also used.The study revealed that when the early tafsīr references were given, the author-copy relationship should be taken into consideration. Because, although some names are mentioned as mufassīr in the sources, it is controversial whether some of them convert the relevant information into written form. Because the period of the compilation is started in the period of tâbiûn in its earliest form. It is understood that even though the writing is partially activated, the tendency to convey information by narration continues from the examples given.The fact that no original work of the period reaches the present day, there is a serious time gap between the oldest manuscripts carrying the relevant information to the present day and its authors raises the issue of the reliability of the information. This is an issue to be considered in research and updating of information. Because it was seen that some information was difficult to determine the author. In addition, it has been understood that there may be additions afterwards besides the possibility of missing or misreported information due to various factors during the transfer. The fact that narration analysis has not been done properly in the context of the tafsīr science can lead to wrong conclusions in some works, if the possibility of reaching the information added later has not been taken into consideration.In addition, creating author copies from manuscripts is a challenging process with some difficulties in itself. No matter how fastidious it is shown, it should not be forgotten that the work is compiled from manuscripts, it should be known that errors may occur despite the maximum sensitivity.It is another point to consider that some information should be associated with the author and turned into a book based on the narrations in the sources of the next period. It should not be forgotten that some works were created by collecting the narrations of the next period. When the process in its formation is not taken into account, there is a possibility that the relevant information creates an early perception of false perception, as well as the belief that it expresses correct and precise information in all aspects due to its connection with the sacred. It is obvious that there is a difference between the original information from the author's pen and the quality and knowledge value of the information collected by claiming belonging to the author from later works. It is necessary to pay attention to this difference in information transfer.Therefore, during the investigation of the envoy, whose main task is to determine the will of Allah, he has to take into account the mentioned features of the early works. Reliable knowledge transfer and correct religion perception can only be achieved with this care. (shrink)

The best of Hegel's early writings, with an introduction on Hegel's philosophical development.

In the tradition of philosophy in Argentina, Hegel has meant to this day a source of important views on the nature of society and history. The Phenomenology of the spirit turns out to be a provocation of the thought that finds in Julio De Zan a privileged interpreter. From his academic beginnings as a professor and researcher, he was initially interested in this work. In the context of this dossier dedicated to “Hegel’s philosophy in Argentina”, we propose an analysis of (...) two articles by Julio De Zan published at different times: “Sense and validity of the Phenomenology of the spirit” and “Experience and praxis. Method questions in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit”. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify the critical role of Hegel's early logic, through an assessment of the dialectical process of sublation [Aufhebung] of the determinations of finite thinking at stake within its exposition. I want to show that the dialectical-critical work of logic has a speculative meaning for Hegel, thereby displaying the inward correspondence between critical and speculative aspects of philosophical activity. By pointing out the evidence from fragmentary texts on logic relating to Hegel's teaching activity (...) in 1801–1802, I will first put into question the idea of an introductory role of logic. In so doing I challenge a widespread reading which argues for the presence of a sharp separation between critical logic and speculative metaphysics. I will then focus on the texts on logic in the 1804–1805 Reinschrift, reading them as the worksite wherein the dawning form of a full-fledged dialectical logic is first prepared and elaborated. More generally, if this paves the way for establishing a continuity between Hegel's early and mature logic and his concept of dialectic, it is also paramount for understanding how the activity of systematic philosophy in the mature version of the system essentially constitutes an ongoing work on the forms of the finite. (shrink)

Euphorion SH 417 deserves to be better known. A curiosity in itself—an apparent poetic reference to number theory—it is also, potentially, one of our earliest references to Euclidean material. On the authority of a late commentator on Aristotle, Euphorion, a mid-third-century b.c. Euboean poet who was also active in Athens and Antioch, is said to have mentioned perfect numbers—i.e. numbers which equal the total of all their factors, including 1 . It is a pity that the context in Euphorion does (...) not survive, and that the line is only preserved, and indeed interpreted, by so late a source. But the wording of the fragment—if Westerink's restoration of its various corruptions is plausible—would strongly suggest a reference to the notion of perfect number. The fragment has been known since Westerink published it in 1960, and was included both in Van Groningen's edition of Euphorion in 1977 and in Supplementum Hellenisticum . But its implications have still not been discussed, and when David Fowler came to gather the evidence for references to Euclidean material in and after the third century b.c. in The Mathematics of Plato's Academy, his attention, unsurprisingly, was not drawn to it. Euphorion has had a bad press, as a poet of rebarbatively obscure myth and intractable vocabulary; yet he holds some interest, and we may be missing more insights into the intellectual life of the Hellenistic period which the perverse intelligence and baneful wit of the fragments display. (shrink)

SummaryIn his doctoral dissertation—The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, finished in 1919 and published as a book in 1920—Walter Benjamin explores the epistemological and aesthetic foundations of the concept of criticism expounded by the early German Romantics Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. Many of the themes in the dissertation recur in his later work, which has led scholars to believe that much of Benjamin's thought is directly influenced by the Romantics. However, a detailed investigation of the origins and development (...) of the dissertation reveals that the picture is much more complicated. Reading the dissertation alongside the biographical material now available, this article argues that the major themes which preoccupy Benjamin in The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, including his theories of language and knowledge as well as his messianic philosophy of history, in fact predate his study of the Romantics. As well as being a potential entry ticket to an academic career, the dissertation constitutes Benjamin's first sustained attempt to develop and consolidate his own epistemology and aesthetics in a more or less systematic way. He does so through a series of ‘judicious interpretations’ of the Romantics, whose work he reads selectively, anachronistically and creatively to provide a vehicle for his own thought. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Renaissance and early modern readings of Aristotle’s _Meteorologica_ I 7.344a5-8, showing how the various interpretations of this passage were foundational for the establishment of an epistemology based on hypotheses and conjectures, and how this passage informed major philosophical and scientific elaborations of the time, extending its influence beyond the original field of application. The paper considers authors such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Philoponus, Nifo, Pomponazzi, Wurstisen, Descartes, Galileo, Charleton and Boyle.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good by Dean MoyarThimo HeisenbergDean Moyar. Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 384. Hardback, $110.00.Hegel's Philosophy of Right is one of those texts that make it easy to miss the forest for the trees. On the argumentative journey from private property and punishment, via the "emptiness" of Kant's moral law to Hegel's vision of a (...) rational social order, it is easy to lose sight of the overall arch of Hegel's argument. Indeed, this kind of problem is confounded by an ever-growing literature on individual ideas and sections of the text (from Hegel's conception of agency to his argument for the market economy), which, while interesting and rewarding on their own, direct our attention to parts of his argument, rather than to the Philosophy of Right as a whole.Dean Moyar's new book is devoted to making us see the forest again—albeit while never leaving the trees out of sight. Indeed, to stretch the metaphor of forest and trees a little bit further, Moyar builds his ambitious endeavor on two new interpretative theses, which enable him to show us completely new paths through and clearings in the forest, bringing to light previously underappreciated aspects of the argument and adding refreshing new takes on the parts of Hegel's view that are already well known.The first of Moyar's two central theses concerns Hegel's methodology in his Philosophy of Right. Moyar maintains that the structure of the Philosophy of Right can be understood as a "teleologically inferentialist" account: the content of the norms of right is developed through use, where at each stage of the argument the content of those norms is refined by sublating previous failures of application. But while this Hegelian process is dynamic, relying on conflicts and their resolution, the process is—in contrast to some pragmatist forms of inferentialism—not open-ended: instead, or so Moyar convincingly argues, it leads to a point of inferential equilibrium as telos of the text (Hegel's vision of Ethical Life), in which some dynamism persists but further development of right is no longer necessary.This kind of interpretation, Moyar argues, has several advantages: it renders the methodology of the Philosophy of Right consistent with the method of Hegel's Logic, but it also provides us with a general template (which Moyar calls the "basic argument" [30 and passim]) on which to understand all the different transitions in the Philosophy of Right as structurally analogous, thereby showing Hegel to be both intertextually and intratextually consistent. Even more, using this basic argument as a template, Moyar puts himself in a position to generate interesting understandings of all the major and minor transitions in Hegel's text, focusing not merely on the most well-known (the transition from Morality to Ethical Life), but also on those that have traditionally received much less attention (such as the minor transition that leads from the contradiction between right [Recht] and welfare [Wohl] to the Good).The second of Moyar's two central theses concerns the importance of the concept of value to Hegel's project. Indeed, Moyar argues that even though the word 'value' (Wert) may not appear frequently in the published version of Hegel's lectures, the concept of value is at work everywhere in the text. Moyar, consequently, traces the presence of this concept throughout the Philosophy of Right, using it to understand many of the forbiddingly [End Page 327] difficult passages, from the dense section on the "Alienation of Property" early on in the part on Abstract Right, to Hegel's later views on the relationship between right and duty, his precarious theory of the "circulation of value" on the market, and finally his view of history at the end of the Philosophy of Right.In this way, Moyar extracts a rich interpretative bounty: he defends a heterodox reading of Hegel as a legal positivist, reconstructs a Hegelian doctrine of public reason, and argues against an "amoral" reading of Hegel's account of history. Most important, perhaps, is his interpretation of the relationship... (shrink)

In 1828, G. W. F. Hegel published a critical review of Johann Georg Hamann, a retrospective of the life and works of one of Germany’s most enigmatic and challenging thinkers and writers. While Hegel’s review had enjoyed a central place in Hamann studies since its appearance, Hegel on Hamann is the first English translation of the important work. Philosophers, theologians, and literary critics welcome Anderson’s stunning translation since Hamann is gaining renewed attention, not only as a key figure of German (...) intellectual history, but also as an early forerunner of postmodern thought. Relationships between Enlightenment, Counter Enlightenment, and Idealism come to the fore as Hegel reflects on Hamann’s critiques of his contemporaries Immanuel Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, J. G. Herder, and F. H. Jacobi. Hegel on Hamann also includes an introduction to Hegel’s review by Anderson, as well as an essay on the role of friendship in Hamann’s life, in Hegel’s thought, and in German intellectual culture more broadly. Rounding out the volume are its extensive annotations and bibliography, which facilitate further study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy in English and German. This book is essential both for readers of Hegel or Hamann and for those interested in the history of German thought, the philosophy of religion, language and hermeneutics, or friendship as a philosophical category. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:378 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY these churches to deal reasonably with frontier conditions and popular prejudices is common knowledge, but it is often forgotten that their founder and guide during the critical days of growth was also an exponent of the late Scottish Enlightenment. To make this careful analysis of Campbell's philosophy, as an extraordinary specimen of empirical method, is a welcome achievement by an experienced empiricist. The volume also (...) contains a Foreword by President Perry E. Gresham of Bethany College, and a comprehensive bibliography of Campbell's writings compiled by Claude E. Spencer. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Cali]ornia Hegel's First American Followers, The Ohio Hegelians: J. B. Stallo, Peter Kau]mann, Moncure Conway, August WiUich. By Loyd D. Easton. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. lx + 353. $7.00.) This expansion of the theme outlined in Professor Easton's article of 1962 gives us fulllength accounts of the careers and ideas of four picturesque characters of the Ohio River Valley during the 19th century. The four had little in common except Hegel, and even him they did not really share, for they interpreted him differently and used him for different interests. The author is somewhat generous in calling them "Hegelians" and "followers" of Hegel, for like practically all those Americans who have been influenced by Hegel, they followed him at a safe distance and not very long. But this diversity makes Easton's account all the more fascinating. He portrays not only four characters but also the culture of Cincinati and its environment. J. B. Stallo is better known among American historians and philosophers than the other three, and deservedly so, for he was more philosophical. But he gains in stature here, noteworthy not only for his philosophy of nature but also as a prominent citizen, judge of a Superior Court, and political leader of a large German community. Stallo had two very different careers: the early Catholic student and teacher of Oken's philosophy of nature, mixed liberally with Schelling's similar system and with Hegel's Encyclopedia and his Phenomenology. Emerson was probably right in getting out of Stallo's General Principles an idea of "nature's rhythmic unfolding" rather than an idea of historical dialectic. Then came the later Stallo (after 1855), a convert from Catholicism and transcendentalism to empiricism, and a devoted follower of Ernst Mach. It is this later Stallo, author in 1881 of The Concepts and Theories oJ Modern Physics, who is better known, and who used the term "relativity" to indicate that physics deals not with things-in-themselves but with the data given to observers. Peter Kaufmann is an excellent representative of those pietists who, when they came to the open spaces and free manners of America, made serious attempts to give their religious "perfectionism" a practical social embodiment in utopian, communal economies. He became a teacher in the Rappite "Community of Equality and Social Harmony" and after a few years founded his own "Society of Germans at Teutonia." The members of this society agreed to devote their communal surplus to the education of orphans, the conversion of Indians, the spreading of the Gospel to "the four corners of the earth", and publishing a weekly Herald o] Better Times. After four years of this Society he moved northward to Canton, Ohio, where he settled down comfortably as a publisher and promoter of public education. His major publication, The Temple oJ Truth, incorporated some ideas on dialectic taken from Hegel. He continued his contacts with many utopian communities and urged his fellow citizens to help in making the United States of America "a saviour nation of the rest of mankind." Moncure Conway, a native of Virginia and graduate of Dickinson College, became an itinerant Methodist minister. But in 1853 the Harvard Divinity School made a Unitarian of him and an enthusiast for the higher criticism of Strauss and the transcendentalism of Hegel. In 1858 his wife introduced him to her home town, Cincinnati, and there he became BOOK REVIEWS 379 the minister of a very influential and liberal congregation. In 1860 he began publication in Cincinnati of The Dial, successor to the New England transcendentalist journal, and used its... (shrink)

In this review, Hegel responds to criticisms leveled against his philosophy by the anonymous author of Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus (1829). Frustrated by his interlocutor’s apparent inability to coherently interpret his work, Hegel scathingly attempts to discredit the character of the text in focus and its author’s critical capacity. He does so by showcasing examples of misrepresentation and misunderstanding in the author’s writing. Hegel contests the increasingly common charge of “pantheism” being leveled against him (...) at that time, wielded here by the anonymous author in a fairly unoriginal comparison between Hegel’s “doctrine” and Spinoza’s system. This review gives insight into the character of early theological responses to Hegel, and highlights Hegel’s polemical tendencies. (shrink)

Euphorion SH 417 deserves to be better known. A curiosity in itself—an apparent poetic reference to number theory—it is also, potentially, one of our earliest references to Euclidean material. On the authority of a late commentator on Aristotle, Euphorion, a mid-third-century b.c. Euboean poet who was also active in Athens and Antioch, is said to have mentioned perfect numbers—i.e. numbers which equal the total of all their factors, including 1. It is a pity that the context in Euphorion does not (...) survive, and that the line is only preserved, and indeed interpreted, by so late a source. But the wording of the fragment—if Westerink's restoration of its various corruptions is plausible—would strongly suggest a reference to the notion of perfect number. The fragment has been known since Westerink published it in 1960, and was included both in Van Groningen's edition of Euphorion in 1977 and in Supplementum Hellenisticum. But its implications have still not been discussed, and when David Fowler came to gather the evidence for references to Euclidean material in and after the third century b.c. in The Mathematics of Plato's Academy, his attention, unsurprisingly, was not drawn to it. Euphorion has had a bad press, as a poet of rebarbatively obscure myth and intractable vocabulary; yet he holds some interest, and we may be missing more insights into the intellectual life of the Hellenistic period which the perverse intelligence and baneful wit of the fragments display. (shrink)

It is often assumed that deflationist accounts of truth are a product of philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century. In this paper I show why this assumption is historically short-sighted. An early version of deflationism about truth can already be found in Brentano’s 1889 lecture “On the Concept of Truth.” That Brentano is a precursor of deflationism has gone largely unnoticed because of a different reception of his lecture: according to most scholars, Brentano proposes in it (...) a revision of the correspondence theory of truth that he later rejected in favour of an epistemic theory. Contrary to this received interpretation, I argue that Brentano actually tried to show how one can minimize an account of truth without thereby sacrificing a robust realist intuition about the objectivity of truth. Brentano held on to this deflationist view in his later years, when he assigned self-evident judgments a primary role in our understanding of truth. (shrink)

In the last decade a great amount of literature that elaborates on Leibniz’ cultural and philosophical openness has emerged. It is therefore odd that there has not been made any direct comments on Chung-Ying Cheng interesting analyses of Leibniz’s writings on Chinese philosophy (Cheng 2000, 2002). By giving a critical review of Cheng’s work on this topic, it is the aim of this paper to integrate some problems of Sino-western philosophical encounters into the Leibniz scholarship of today. In the course (...) of analyzing Cheng’s arguments the paper points to some problems in his approach to Leibnizian philosophy and its “encounter” with Chinese classics. After challenging Cheng’s reading of Leibniz and suggesting alternative interpretations, the paper discusses whether thisunderstanding of Leibniz could designate a positive approach to Sino‐western philosophical exchange. Central to this, the question is raised whether or not it can be shown that Leibniz remained open to rethink his own philosophy in the light of his meeting with Chinese philosophy. While the paper agrees with Cheng in the judgement that Leibniz did not arrive at a complete understanding of the Chinese classic Yijing, it claims that Cheng’s analysis contradicts some of Leibniz’s other writings on China as well as Leibniz’s general ambition of supporting global philosophical exchange. (shrink)

Such love, though it expends itself in generosity and thoughtfulness, though it give birth to visions and to great poetry, remains among the sharpest expressions of self-interest. Not until it has passed through a long servitude, through its own self-hatred, through mockery, through great doubts, can it take its place among the loyalties.most readers will be at least generally familiar with the details of Hegel’s so-called struggle for recognition, his account of the emergence of communal life in chapter 4 of (...) the Phenomenology of Spirit. “Consciousness,” the argument’s protagonist, at a certain stage interprets its desire for wisdom as a desire for the regard of another; it first tries to secure it by forcing the.. (shrink)

Cet article vise à montrer que, malgré le peu d'importance que les études récentes de la philosophie hégélienne de la religion accordent aux écrits antérieurs à la Phénoménologie, l'analyse des Jugensdschriften reste indispensable : a) pour comprendre la genèse de la thèse, centrale dans la Religionsphilosophie, sur la différence entre la raison et l'entendement, b) pour reconnaître que la logique de l'absolu employée par la théologie hégélienne fut davantage le résultat de l'attachement de Hegel à son idéal de raison et (...) de sa critique du Kantisme, que le fruit de sa méditation du christianisme ; c) pour découvrir l'unité du développement de la pensée hégélienne.The aim of this paper is to show that, even though recent studies of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion do not consider important the analysis of his early writings for the reconstruction of his mature thought, the exegesis of the Jugendschriften remains indispensable : a) for understanding the genesis of a position which is central in Hegel's Religionsphilosophie, namely his thesis on the difference between intellect and reason ; b) for acknowledging that the logic of the absolute, used by Hegel's theology, was more the result of his attachement to an ideal of reason and of his critique of Kant, than the fruit of his meditation of Christianity ; c) for discovering the unity in the development of Hegel's thought. (shrink)

This article traces a line of theorisation regarding the state-civil society relationship, from Marx’s early writings to Gramsci’s conception of the integral state. The article argues that Marx developed, through his critique of Hegel, a valuable understanding of the state-civil society connection that emphasised the antagonism between them in capitalist societies. Alternatively, Gramsci’s conception of the ‘integral state’ posits an interconnection and dialectical unity of the state and civil society, where the latter is integrated under the leadership of the (...) former. The article argues that while Marx and Gramsci’s positions are, at first, seemingly incongruous ideas – as to the ‘separation’ in Marx and ‘integration’ in Gramsci – this tension can be bridged when the integral state is understood as being always necessarily unstable. The article argues that this framework can help us understand the contemporary breakdown of political rule in the phenomenon known as ‘anti-politics’. (shrink)

Etymologies are often encountered in Vedic prose, in Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads. Though they have received a fair amount of scholarly attention, Vedic etymologies still present a challenge to interpreters. To respond to it, I critically review previous interpretations, and focus on three case studies, Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 1.1.2, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.3, and Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8. In my interpretation, I emphasize the need for a contextual reading, foreground Vedic etymologies’ complexity and sophistication, and call attention to the variety of (...) purposes they serve to achieve as well as to Vedic etymologists’ agency. Supplementing conventional interpretations concentrating mostly on their religious-magical aspects, I describe Vedic etymologies as discursive devices used by Vedic authors to further their thoughts and agendas. (shrink)

This paper explores one aspect of the political in the early Hegel, that of criminal action and its relationship to the concept of recognition in the System of Ethical Life. While it is clear that in this work Hegel thinks that criminal action plays an important role in the transformation of simple ethical communities, it is not clear that, for Hegel, the formal character of crime in the struggle for recognition is anything but negative. I attempt to show how (...) this role for crime leads Hegel to a legalistic conception of Right that has no solid connection with recognition as a social force. (shrink)

In a sense it would be inappropriate to speak of “Hegel’s system of philosophy,” because Hegel thought that in the strict sense there is only one system of philosophy evolving in the Western world. In Hegel’s view, although at times philosophy’s history seems to be a chaotic series of crisscrossing interpretations of meanings and values, with no consensus, there has been a teleological development and consistent progress in philosophy and philosophizing from the beginning; Hegel held that his own version of (...) “German idealism” was simply bringing to final expression the latest refinements of an ongoing, perennial system. If we take Hegel at his word, then one of the best entries into his system would be through the history of philosophy, showing how systems and schools of thought prior to Hegel led up to his system. The most important currents to focus on, however, would be in modern philosophy, in which especially intensive changes led ultimately to German idealism and Hegel’s immediate predecessors. Fortunately, Hegel lectured extensively on the history of modern philosophy and structured his lectures in such a way as to throw light on the status of the “one system” of Western philosophy at the time — the status to which Hegel felt he had been contributing and was continuing to contribute. These lectures are of interest, first of all, as a systematic chronicle of philosophical positions in the heyday of modern philosophy, from Bacon to Hegel. Second, they are interesting because Hegel’s critical comments on his predecessors clarify his own positions: for example, the dialectic method and the importance of triplicity, the relationship of philosophy to the scientific method, the necessity for avoidance of the extremes of empiricism and of idealism, the subject/object problematic, the “identity” of rationality and reality, and the technical meaning in Hegel’s philosophy of “absolute,” “infinity,” and the “idea.”. (shrink)

Ontology: An Ontological Interpretation to Baudrillard’s Consumption Society TheoryJean Baudrillard used “Consumption society” to describe a novel transformation of the contemporary life, “consumption society” has become to the symbol of contemporary ideology. From this we can say that reading Jean Baudrillard is very necessary. Compared with what Jean Baudrillard said, what we comprehended is more important, so it is very necessary to analyze Jean Baudrillard’s consumption society theory on the ontological viewpoint. To this, Iattach great important to the follow (...) key issues: what kind of existent character Jean Baudrillard revealed? Hegel’s modern western philosophy participated in the foundation of the Capitalist civilization; Jean Baudrillard was unavoidably involved in, so what is the advancement in theory system? How to define the demarcation to Jean Baudrillard? He animadverted on Marx and appropriated his valuable thoughts. (shrink)

Spanish readers are fortunate in having a publishing house which is committed to reproduce in Spanish the complete works of Georg Lukács. The complete edition will consist of twenty-four, or more, volumes, of which ten are already in print, covering mainly Lukács works on esthetics and literary criticism. The Hegel volume was originally published in German in 1948. The main draft was written as early as the fall of 1938, but the outbreak of World War II delayed publication. Lukács (...) at that time was in the Soviet Union where, following Stalin's lead, Hegel was characterized as an apologist for the Prussian feudal opposition to the French revolution. Considering the winning of the war as more important than provoking a controversy over Hegel, Lukács put his manuscript aside for the duration. In The Young Hegel, Lukács settles his account with Hegel, much as Marx and Engels in The German Ideology--with one significant difference. The objective of Marx and Engels was the abolition of Hegelianism. Their polemic, therefore, was directed against Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. Lukács, on the other hand, sought the restoration of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism, and, while accepting the Marxian critique of Hegelianism, directed his attack against the detractors of Hegel--against the Stalin line within Marxism and against those like Dilthey and Kierkegaard outside of Marxism who transformed Hegel into an "irrationalist." Lukács is consequently much more positive in his treatment of Hegel than Marx and Engels. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács emphasized the necessity of understanding Hegel in order to properly understand Marx. In The Young Hegel, the emphasis is on the dialectical opposite--Hegel is understood through the eyes of Marx, through the critique of Marx and through a Marxian interpretation by Lukács. Lukács' unique contribution in the present work is the detailed study of the close union of philosophy and economics in the genesis of Hegel's thought. Indeed, the original subtitle of the German edition reads: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie. The Spanish edition has a two-and-a-half page preface, written specially for it by Lukács in 1963, in which he states his conviction of the importance in the thought of Hegel and other great philosophers of concern with economic problems, both from the standpoint of economic theory and actual economic conditions. An English edition has been promised by Merlin Press in London, but no date of publication has yet been announced.--H. B. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF EARLY CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM ROBIN DARLING YOUNG The Oatholio University of A.merioa Washington, D.O. Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Sebastian Brock and Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Holy Women of the Syria.n Orient. Be1·keley: University of California Press, 1987. Elizabeth A. Clark, Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith. Essays on Late Ancient Christianity. (...) Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986. Elain~ Pagels, Adam, Eve and the Serpent. New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1988. Introduction FROM THE FIRST century, the development of patristic Christology, both orthodox and heterodox, was the result of a collective reflection upon the identity and redemptive action of Jesus, the Logos, who was en arche and became incarnate at a specific point in the history of the cosmos. Likewise, the development of the patristic theory of askesis, tihe devout discipline of the Christian, beginning within the New Testament canon, was a discussion of how the Christian might, through his moral life, move toward the goal offered him by the Logos: conversion to, identification with, and eventual unification with Jesus Christ. This occurred by the means of progressive discipline and love in the company of other believers and employed methods older than Christianity itself. What made and makes Christian askesis unique as a U4 ROBIN DARLING YOUNG religious self-discipline is the personal identification of the believer with Christ. It is undeniable that Christolo~J, soteriology, and ascetical theory have been linked historically. The answer to the question, "Who do men say that I am?" (Mt. 16.13) will imply the form of the response to the divine imperative of " follow me" (:~11. 16.24,Q5). Those theologians of the early church who were blessed with consistency almost automatically adjusted their Christology and their moral theology. A concise statement of this connection may be found in Irenaeus's Against Heresis (5.18-20). "[Christ] caused man to cleave to and to become one with God... unless man had been joined to God, he could never have become a partaker of immortality." The result of the incarnation is the imperative.for human beings, now freed by the " most holy and merciful Lord, [who] loves the human race" (18.6), to model their actions after his (20.2). Origen's Exhortation to 1Vlartyrdom recalls the earlier formulation of Paul when he refers to " the mind of Christ within us" (ch. 4) and states that "Now it is revealed whether or not we have taken up our cross and followed Jesus. This will have happened if Christ is living in us " (12). The willingness to face martyrdom was the great test of Christ's inner presence : " I think that they love God with all their soul who with a great desire to be in union with God withdraw and separate their soul not only from the earthly hody but from eveTything material " (3). Such an exhortation, which sees askesis as a preparation for martyrdom as well as a mode of life, had already been clear-·ly enunciated hy Ignatius (To the Ephesians, 4). Ignatius, "called Theophoros (God-bearer)," wrote that he had "welcomed that beloved name of yours, earned through your natural righteousness in accordance with faith and love in Christ Jesus, our savior. Imitating God [incarnate] and inflamed by the blood of God [in the Eucharist] you accomplished your common task perfectly." EARLY CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM H5 Together with Paul, Ignatius left a legacy of early Christi.an opinion remarkable for the unity it proposes between Christ.and the Christian. Reflecting upon the incarnation, it understands Christ,as redeemer and model for Christians. Although critical Biblical scholarship has for decades prescinded from a portrait of Christ himself, as opposed to the communities founded hy him, most early Christians considered him to have been a single, celibate person. They did not, of course, think of Christ as a monk in the later sense of the term, hut their insistence that the Christian moral life of ascesis and sacrifice,be modeled upon Jesus' own life can he seen a:s preparing the way for such a view of Christ. The best reason for... (shrink)

The philosophical reception of German Romanticism, lead by Manfred Frank, has focused on Novalis’ early notes while studying Fichte, titled by the editors of the critical edition, the Fichte-Studien. Frank’s claim that these notes contain the most important philosophical contribution of Romanticism has played an especially influential role in the Anglo-American interpretations of Novalis and of philosophical Romanticism in general. In this paper I contest the coherency of these notes, and argue that a proper interpretation of Novalis must (...) take into account his later works as well (something which surprisingly few American scholars do). In addition, I argue that the Fichte-Studien contain two mutually exclusive conceptions of being and the status of being, and show that in addition to Frank’s “skeptical realist” conception, a second, more idealist conception, can be found in the notes—a conception, I show, which is more in line with Novalis’ later writings. I admit, however, that although this more idealist understanding of being appears to resolve many interpretive issues, these notes are ultimately inconclusive and thus cannot be the only source for interpreting Novalis as philosopher. Rather, they can only serve as the stepping-stone from which one can begin to see the questions and concerns which occupy Novalis from this early stage, without, however, providing any answers. In this way, I hope to challenge the contemporary reception of philosophical Romanticism, and of Novalis in particular. (shrink)

Alfredo Ferrarin has written an excellent study of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle. He clearly states his intention on p. 18: He wishes to examine the “effective presence of Aristotelian themes in Hegel,” particularly that of energeia, in order to follow the way in which “the idea of autoreferential activity in its Aristotelan sense operates in the details and in the particular contents of Hegel’s interpretation [of Aristotle] and in the course of Hegel’s own philosophy.” Bringing together an admirable (...) familiarity with the principal texts, fine linguistic skills, and a wide-ranging knowledge of the secondary literature, Ferrarin presents the reader with a treatment that is careful in its details, clear in its structure, and altogether up to the daunting task it sets for itself. For, as Ferrarin notes several times, the appropriation of Aristotle is so important for Hegel that Aristotle’s thought does not appear confined within a few categories of the Science of Logic or a few spiritual shapes in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but constitutes a pretext, a “model” of a “philosophy of unification” that Hegel takes up at all levels of his own thought. (shrink)

This article assesses Frank I. Michelman’s constitution-centered and proceduralist interpretation of Rawls’ conception of political legitimacy and argues that it merits attention because it highlights the institutional aspects of Rawls’ understanding of political legitimacy for constitutional democracies. However, the article also questions Michelman’s interpretation of Rawls’ ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ (LPL) and the later ‘idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity’ (ILBR). As Michelman rightly points out, for the exercise of political power to be legitimate (...) in a constitutional democracy, it must be in accordance with a constitution that is itself legitimate or reasonably acceptable to free and equal citizens. Yet, the article argues that Rawls’ two legitimacy formulations are attempts to make an additional point: Namely that when democratic citizens exercise political power in ‘the fundamental political issues’, or in issues that shape the basic justice of society or the essentials of the constitution itself, they must respect the ideal of public reason – or ensure themselves and other citizens that their exercise of political power is in accordance with the underlying basic political-moral ideas of persons and society that make the constitution itself acceptable to them. The LPL and the ILBR are conceptions of political legitimacy, not in the sense of setting up a criterion for when a specific law is legitimate, but in the sense of outlining civic or “office-specific” constraints that citizens and public officials must put on their reasoning and exercise of political power in the fundamental political issues for the practice of a constitutional democracy to be legitimate, or well-ordered, reasonably just, and stable for the right reasons – in the long run. The article also discusses why Rawls saw the need to reformulate the LPL, and how the later ILBR assigns a new significance to citizens’ actual use of public reason and their intersubjective deliberation. (shrink)

Explores the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity - two fundamendtal features of human subjectivity - as it developed in early modern philosophy. Udo Thiel presents a critical evaluation of these features as they were conceived in the sevententh and eighteenth centuries. He explains the arguments of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume, as well as their early critics, followers, and other philosophical contemporaries, and situates them within their historical contexts. Interest in the issues of (...) self-consciousness and personal identity is in many ways characteristic [of] and even central to early modern thought, but Thiel argues here that this is also an interest that continues to this day, in a form still strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks of early modern thought. In this book he attempts to broaden the scope of the treatment of these issues considerably, covering more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain, and Germany while remaining attentive to the details of the arguments under scrutiny and discussing alternative interpretations in many cases"--Publisher's description, p. [4] of dust jacket. (shrink)

The discovery and interpretation of Hegel by British philosophers, most of them trained in the empirical tradition, is one of the most fascinating confrontations in the intellectual history of more recent British philosophy. Forgotten and ignored by English scholars, British Idealism, although short-lived, has recently been rediscovered as an important philosophical movement in its own right.

In this paper, I approach Hegel’s philosophy under the banner of a “Keplerian Revolution”, the implicit reference being, of course, to Kant’s supposed Copernican philosophical revolution. Kepler had been an early supporter of the Copernican paradigm in astronomy, but went well beyond his predecessor, and so is invoked here in an attempt to capture some of the important ways in which Hegel attempted to go beyond the philosophy of Kant. To make these issues more determinate, however, Hegel’s Keplerian orientation (...) will not be presented in its contrast to Kant’s “Copernicanism” as such, but as contrasted with that of another early follower of Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and this Brunian orientation will be used to characterize Kant’s philosophy as seen from Hegel’s rival Keplerian point of view. Interpreting Hegel as a philosophical Keplerian will require that we broach those worrisome aspects of Kepler’s astronomy, namely his support for Plato’s cosmology and the tradition of the “music of the spheres”, but this will be shown to have connections to Hegel’s own approach to logic. This in turn will help shed light on the meaning of Hegel’s form of idealism and, in particular, on its usually unacknowledged Platonic dimensions. (shrink)

This article aims to reconstruct Jacques Derrida’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy as established prior to the publication of Glas (1974). During the late 1960s, a moment in whi-ch the philosophical context was marked by a strong anti-Hegelianism, Derrida’s deconstru-ction was received as the opposite of Hegel’s speculative idealism. While this opposition became the most accepted version of the French philosopher’s position towards Hegel, there are discernible affinities between the two thinkers. This paper analyzes the texts dedicated to Hegel before 1974: (...) “Le problème de la genèse dans la phénomenologie de Husserl”, “De l’économie restreinte à l’économie générale. Un hégélianisme sans réserve” and “Le Puits et la pyramide. Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel”. It demonstrates that despite an appa-rent explicit rejection of dialectical thinking, Derrida consistently acknowledged its relevan-ce, declaring a unilateral break as impossible, and, at least during the early stages of his ca-reer, conceived the possibility of a deconstructive interpretation of Hegel’s thought. (shrink)

Hegel’s dispute with Schleiermacher in Berlin had as its premise his reception of Schleiermacher’s Reden über die Religion. My intention is to clarify the history of this reception by arguing that Hegel’s Frankfurt early writings already contain clues as to his reading of Schleiermacher’s work. Differently from previous interpretations, however, I will not support the hypothesis that, during his Frankfurt period, Hegel was influenced by Schleiermacher’s foundations of religion. My contention is that, from the very beginning, Hegel opposed Schleiermacher’s (...) concepts of positivity and polemics as specific features of the Christian religion. This view is confirmed if we analyze the works that Hegel wrote in the Jena period, such as Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie, Glauben und Wissen and Phänomenologie des Geistes. My aim is to demonstrate that these works typify Schleiermacher’s approach to the Christian religion, and in so doing, to confute the idea that Hegel’s view on the above-mentioned approach changed over the years. A final aspect that I consider is the enduring nature of Hegel’s conception of the significance of the Reden – an aspect that emerges on analyzing some crucial sentences in the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. (shrink)

Abstract:Daoist thought often takes nothingness as a foundational source of generation that can also be harnessed to good government. This study re-interprets the Daodejing's original discourse on nothingness in terms of an original condition, which it connects to the variety of philosophically significant wu-compounds found throughout the text. It examines two early articulations of this discourse by drawing a contrast between the thought of Laozi and the thought of Heshang Gong.

This paper offers a revisionary interpretation of Sartre's early views on human freedom. Sartre articulates a subtle account of a fundamental sense of human freedom as autonomy, in terms of human consciousness being both reasons-responsive and in a distinctive sense self-determining. The aspects of Sartre's theory of human freedom that underpin his early ethics are shown to be based on his phenomenological analysis of consciousness as, in its fundamental mode of self-presence, not an object in the world. (...) Sartre has a multi-level theory of the reasons-sensitivity of consciousness. At one level, consciousness's being alive to reasons is a matter of the affective perception of values and disvalues as features of phenomenal objects. This part of his theory, a development of Scheler's, is, however, situated within a broader phenomenological analysis resulting in the claim that the ultimate reasons acknowledged by consciousness neither are nor justifiably could be values adequately presentable as intentional objects. Consciousness's ultimate reasons are, in this sense, not given by the world but by itself. Section 4 reconstructs and assesses Sartre's argument that consciousness cannot rationally have an ultimate end other than self-transparent freedom itself. (shrink)

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary "incompatibilist" terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the "compatibilist" sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what (...) he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations, notably including Hegel's and Wood's, of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory. (shrink)

Volume 4 of’ “The Early Works” series covers the period of Dewey’s last year and one-half at the University of Michigan and his first half-year at the University of Chicago. In addition to sixteen articles the present volume contains Dewey’s reviews of six books and three articles, verbatim reports of three oral statements made by Dewey, and a full-length book, The Study of Ethics. Like its predecessors in this series, this volume presents a “clear text,” free of interpretive or (...) reference material. Apparatus, including references, corrections, and emendations, is confined to appendix material. Fredson Bowers, the Consulting Textual Editor, has provided an essay on the textual principles and procedures, and Wayne A. R. Leys, Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University, has written an Introduction discussing the relationship between Dewey’s writings of this period and his later work. That Dewey’s scholarship and writing was at an especially high level during 1893 and 1894 may be considered an index to the significance of this two-year period. (shrink)

This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein’s approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment of metaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein’s thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre- Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the angle (...) of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate – questions concerning the method of the Tractatus , its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science, metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor’s ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness. (shrink)

It is a widely held view among scholars and commentators on the works of Jean-Paul Sartre that his corpus can be roughly divided into an early, largely a-political, non-Marxist period, and a later, more overtly political, post-liberation period. InThe Early Sartre and Marxism, Sam Coombes seeks to problematise this interpretation of Sartre’s corpus by undertaking a re-evaluation of a wide array of pre-liberation and early post-liberation writings in order to establish the extent to which views fully (...) consistent with a certain brand of Marxism are already present therein. The later period, he argues, does not so much constitute a break from the early work as a more complete development of certain nascent themes and concerns. There are difficulties inherent in any claim that Sartre’s early work is consonant with Marxism, primarily due to the fundamental incompatibilities between Sartre’s ontological description of liberation as a project of individual freedom and the inherent hostility of interpersonal relations, and Marxism’s requirements of the development of class consciousness and social solidarity for revolutionary action. Nonetheless, the modest claim that through the 1930s and early ’40s themes and ideas are appearing in Sartre’s work that are indeed not abandoned but constitute the basis of Sartre’s later more directly Marxist writings is compelling and may serve to reopen fruitful speculative philosophical dialogue between Sartre’s early existentialism and Marxism. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)

ArgumentLinking up with recent studies on the experience of space and place in modern youth literature, this article analyzes how the “journey” as a narrative line and motif transformed Dutch early modern travel books for children from classical teaching instruments into explorative knowledge places. In the popular seventeenth-century Glorious and Fortunate Journey to the Holy Land, young readers were invited to travel within the book, which was presented as a place that covers material pages to observe as well as (...) imagined places to read about. Eighteenth-century travel books, for example written by Joachim Heinrich Campe, shifted from an inner to an empirical mode of travelling. They raised the suggestion that they offered unmediated observations and travel experiences, as if reading about places was equal to seeing places. Since travel literature facilitated active knowledge quisition among youngsters, but also left little room for autonomous innovations or different interpretations, this article reveals the emancipatory as well as restrictive character of such places of learning. By turning reading into a kind of travelling, travel books served as a substitute for travel. (shrink)

Empathy – Interpretation – (Interpreting) Apperception. Attempts to Explain Husserl’s First Steps Towards a Theory of Intersubjectivity. The aim of this paper is to investigate Husserl’s first steps towards a theory of intersubjectivity and his early attempts to solve the intricate questions pertaining to the constitution of alter ego. The starting point of this investigation is Husserl’s critical examination of the concept of empathy theorized by Th. Lipps and his contention that empathy cannot be a passive and rather (...) quasi-instinctive activity of the ego, but must be grounded in a kind of analogy between my own body and that of the other. This first attempt to explain in phenomenological terms how an ego can be aware of and perceive other thigs as egos is marred by difficulties that force Husserl to constantly rethink the question of the constitution of the alter ego and propose new ways of conceiving the special kind of apperception that opens up the possibility of perceiving the others as alter egos. (shrink)